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by A A Lonie & D M Power 
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University of Dundee 
Introduction 
The possible consequences for Scotland of the 
present policy of high interest rates are of more 
than academic interest. The sequence of eleven 
successive increases in the clearing banks' base 
rate between 2 June 1988 and 5 October 1989 which 
raised interest rates from 7.5 per cent to 15 per 
cent is one of the most remarkable in British 
financial history. Although there have been other 
periods of sustained increases in short rates (eg. 
between September 1971 and November 1973), the 
only recent comparable episode occurred in the 
years 1979-1981 when the authorities repeatedly 
raised the banks' base rate as part of their 
counter-inflationary strategy. The subsequent 
financial pressure on the UK economy contributed 
to the largest contraction in manufacturing output 
of any industrialised country. 
The Bank of England does not normally attempt to 
spell out the regional implications of its 
monetary policies. Nevertheless, the analysis of 
the February 1989 issue of the Bank of England 
Quarterly Bulletin appeared to contain good news 
for Scotland because it argued that the highly 
geared consumer would bear the brunt of high 
interest rates. As Vines and Bell (1989) have 
recently emphasised, consumer spending is likely 
to be less tightly constrained by dear money in 
Scotland than in the South-East of England because 
of the relatively low burden of mortgage payments 
on Scottish householders and, more generally, 
because of Scotland's less active participation in 
the UK credit boom of 1988. However, any benefits 
that Scotland may gain from its relatively low 
level of owner occupation and its failure to share 
fully in the rapid growth of real incomes and 
property values that has characterised the South-
East of England should be set against the possible 
consequences of high interest rates for Scottish 
manufacturing industry. 
There are two main reasons for tentatively 
suggesting that Scottish industry may be more 
severely affected by high interest rates than that 
of the South-East. First, the relatively strong 
export orientation of Scottish industry, notably 
in electronics, whisky, textiles and oil, renders 
it more sensitive to the contractionary effects of 
an overvalued exchange rate (Vines and Bell, 
1989). The UK exchange rate has been maintained at 
a level significantly higher than the rate which 
would have resulted from a free play of market 
forces only by extraordinary increases in short-
term interest rates. Such a policy places export 
industries at a disadvantage. Second, the Scottish 
manufacturing base and the manufacturing sectors 
of several regions located outside the South-East 
of England appear to have experienced greater 
hardship than those of the South-East; their 
industrial structures have contained a 
disproportionate share of industries that have 
proved in the past to be unusually sensitive to 
the effects of sharply increased interest rates. 
This apparent sensitivity of certain manufacturing 
sectors to steep rises in interest rates is the 
principle theme of this article. 
Certain economic commentators, notably David Lomax 
of NatWest and Jim Walker of The Royal Bank of 
Scotland , have recently predicted that Scotland 
will outperform the rest of the UK, including the 
South-East, in 1989 and 1990. However, according 
to our analysis Scotland is likely to achieve more 
rapid growth in manufacturing output than the 
South-East only if the industrial structures of 
the two regions have undergone a radical 
transformation in their respective sensitivities 
to high interest rates in the course of the 1980s. 
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Disentangling Interest Rate Effects 
The task of gauging the relevance of past 
movements in interest rates is made difficult by 
changes in the rate of inflation associated with 
such increases and by differences in the 
relationship between short rates and long rates, 
as well as by variations in the tightness of 
fiscal stance, in exchange rates, and in other 
elements of the macroeconomic environment. At the 
risk of oversimplifying a complex issue, our 
concern is not with (a) interest rate increases 
which result (after a lag) from equilibrating 
capital market pressures generated by the 
inflationary process, but with (b) sharp increases 
in the Base Rate commanded by the Treasury and 
Bank of England which are designed to curb the 
excess domestic demand for goods and services 
and/or to defend the pound. In practice, the 
distinction between the two categories is not 
always clear-cut, but we appear to be on safe 
ground in classifying the increases in Base Rate 
by a full percentage point, which occurred on 24 
August 1988, 25 November 1988, 24 May 1989 and 5 
October 1989, as class (b) changes. Real (or 
inflation-adjusted) short-term interest rates are 
once again at a level that are exceptional by 
historical standards. 
Vulnerable Industries 
If we concentrate for the moment purely on 
interest rates as a cost which has to be deducted 
from operating profit, it is possible to identify 
a number of large industrial sectors that exhibit 
an unusual degree of "interest sensitivity". By 
classing such industries as "interest sensitive" 
we simply mean that any rise in interest rates 
inflicts a much more severe penalty on their 
operations than on the average company. We 
attempt to measure this sensitivity by employing 
the rough and ready device of a ratio of interest 
payments/operating profit; industries for whom 
this ratio rose to a figure in excess of 40 per 
cent between 1980 and 1982 are classified as 
"interest sensitive". Although 40 per cent is an 
arbitrary figure, it represents the approximate 
peak percentage for the interest/operating profit 
ratio of all UK manufacturing companies in the 
record year (for such ratios) of 1974. An 
advantage of employing a ratio is that it is 
possible to make comparisons over time without 
paying any special heed to the associated rates of 
inflation. This approach also has the Keynesian 
virtue of using as an economic indicator the 
magnitudes that concern businessmen in practice. 
As Figure 1 illustrates, the interest/operating 
profit ratio rose from 31.8 per cent in 1979 to 
peak at 65.7 per cent in 1982 in the worst 
affected industrial sectors (motors, shipping and 
transport, textiles, metals and metal forming, 
chemicals and mechanical engineering) compared 
with a far from contemptible increase from 23.5 
per cent to 36.0 per cent over the same period for 
the UK as a whole. Such a spectacular rise of the 
ratio for the interest sensitive industries 
requires an explanation. The early 1980s saw a 
dramatic reduction in profits for these sectors; 
an operating loss was recorded in 1980 for the 
motor sector. When this collapse in profits is 
combined with steeply rising interest costs, the 
effect on the ratio is dramatic. 
The industries that we have characterised as 
interest sensitive were declining at a rate that 
was rapid even by the standard of the fast-
contracting UK manufacturing sector: employment in 
interest sensitive industries fell from 44.6 per 
cent of total employment in manufacturing industry 
in 1978 to 41.6 per cent in 1980, declining 
further to 37.9 per cent in 1985; net output in 
interest sensitive industries made a 
correspondingly smaller contribution to 
manufacturing output, declining from 44.8 per cent 
of manufacturing industry net output in 1978 to 
41.2 per cent in 1980 and 39.9 per cent in 1985. 
It is pertinent to enquire whether the interest 
sensitive industries are located predominantly in 
the South-East of England, since it would be a 
supreme irony if a measure intended to take the 
steam out of the South-East had its major impact 
on regions which have so far failed to share in 
the boom. 
According to data from the 1981 Census of 
Production it seems probable that this is 
precisely what has happened in the past. Of the 
six interest sensitive industries, only the motor 
and chemical industries, with respectively 30.7 
per cent and 28.9 per cent employment in the 
South-East in 1981, employed more than the South-
East's average share of UK manufacturing 
employment (Table 1). Numbers employed in the 
South-East were, relatively speaking, particularly 
low in the textile, shipbuilding and repairing, 
and metals and metal forming industries, which are 
important employers in Scotland, the Northern 
region, Yorkshire and Humberside and East 
Midlands. In other words, the South-East is "in 
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deficit" overall in interest sensitive industries. 
Indeed, the exposure of the South of England as a 
whole to increased interest charges has been 
limited by a pattern of manufacturing production 
which favoured industries with no special 
sensitivity to rises in the rate of interest. By 
contrast, Scotland and the North of England appear 
to have developed industrial structures that were 
unusually susceptible to the effects of higher 
interest rates. It is possible that the relative 
immunity of the South-East to high interest rates 
is even greater than our calculations suggest. 
This further disparity would occur within the 
interest sensitive sector if the average firm in 
the South-East region displayed greater financial 
strength than its counterparts in the rest of the 
UK; such is plausibly the case with the richest UK 
reg ion. 
A point that modifies our conclusions in the 
opposite direction is that interest sensitive 
industries tend to be high liquidation (and high 
contraction of output and employment) industries. 
Each successive period of "dear money" purges 
these industries of their most vulnerable 
elements, shrinking the sectors to what may become 
relative insignificance, or, as occurred in the 
motor industry in Scotland, helping to eliminate 
them almost entirely; according to 1985 Census of 
Production data Scotland had a lower share of the 
percentage employed in the metal manufacturing, 
mechanical engineering, motor and textile 
industries in 1985 than in 1981. 
The sharp rise in the profiles of the index of 
liquidations (see Figure 2) during the last 
notable period of sudden Base Rate increases 
appears striking, both for the worst hit sectors 
and for the aggregate of all sectors. 
Liquidations continued at record levels during the 
Thatcherite "economic boom" years between 1982 and 
1986 as output, profits and new company 
registrations displayed strong growth, presumably 
because many of the newly registered companies 
failed within a year or two of their birth. 
The comparative position of Scotland's 
insolvencies is also of interest. Table 2 
highlights the fact that company insolvencies in 
Scotland were increasing rapidly at the start of 
the 1980s. Moreover, while the mortality rate was 
rising for Scottish companies, the number of new 
companies registered in the region actually 
declined in 1980. Scotland's profile of new 
company registrations is symptomatic of a 
disadvantaged region which suffers more than the 
rest of the economy in recession. 
The histograms and tables provide a graphic 
reminder that within a general economic expansion 
there may be notable disparities in the fortunes 
of both individual industries and regions. 
Vulnerable Companies 
Financial vulnerability has often been defined 
with reference to a company's small size and 
relatively illiquid balance sheet position. This 
emphasis is appropriate to the extent that small 
size tends to place companies in a relatively high 
risk category among applicants for loans. Compared 
with large enterprises their profitability is 
characteristically lower, the variability of their 
profits greater, their sales more volatile, their 
opportunities for diversification more limited, 
and their failure rate higher. For these reasons 
small companies should suffer more than larger 
concerns when credit standards are raised. 
Yet financial vulnerability is not a necessary 
attribute of small companies, nor is it based on 
an illiquid balance sheet structure in a 
quantitative sense. The essence of financial 
vulnerability is the inability of the illiquid 
company to escape from a position of balance sheet 
disequilibrium by making an adjustment towards a 
preferred structure of assets and liabilities 
appropriate to a "dear money" economic climate. 
The Bank of England is, therefore, almost 
certainly wrong to contemplate with equanimity the 
rapid increase in bank borrowing and associated 
gearing ratios by the company sector in the 1980s 
because it has been matched by a build up of 
liquid assets. The fact that record company 
liquidations have occurred alongside this 
accumulation of liquid assets strongly suggests 
that the improvement in company profits and 
liquidity has been heavily skewed. 
Let us focus on a characteristically vulnerable 
manufacturing company. A sequence of increases in 
bank base rates from 7.5 per cent to 15.0 per cent 
increases its interest/operating profit ratio and 
the shock of the unanticipated interest rate rises 
will tend to heighten uncertainty about future 
sales and profits. 
The rise in borrowing costs sharply reduces net 
profits. In addition, the vulnerable company's 
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liquid assets may come under pressure on several 
fronts. These causes of financial pressure are 
worth examining in greater detail. First, the 
company's ability to pay its creditors will depend 
more directly on the prompt payment by its debtors 
as cash flow interdependence heightens. If it is 
in a weak position vis-a-vis its customers, the 
company is liable to be compelled to extend its 
credit period, increasing liquid assets recorded 
in the balance sheet but reducing effective 
company liquidity as the cash inflow slows down. A 
small company that has reached its overdraft limit 
and is experiencing severe financial pressure may 
be embarrassed by a delay in payment of a bill for 
as little as £30,000. Should the company have the 
misfortune to be in an equally weak position 
relative to its suppliers, it may be forced to pay 
its bills more quickly that in the past, reducing 
trade credit taken. In other words, vulnerable 
companies tend to be the victims of what J.K. 
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Galbraith (1957) dubbed "coercive credit" whereby 
trade credit is extracted from suppliers by 
customers with superior trading power, 
transferring the main burden of liquidity 
contraction and balance sheet adjustment from 
stronger to weaker companies. Moreover, in the new 
regime of higher interest rates and 
correspondingly lower bond prices, the hard 
pressed company can only replenish its depleted 
cash balances by selling off any marketable 
securities that it may possess at a capital loss. 
Recourse to additional bank borrowing now carries 
a heightened interest rate penalty and may not, in 
any case, be freely available since banks will 
discriminate against their riskier customers in a 
"dear money" environment. Any rise in interest 
rates that reduces the liquidity of bank assets is 
likely to be associated with stiffer credit 
standards and a measure of credit rationing. The 
American economists J Stiglitz and A Weiss noted 
in 1981 that such a course of action was dictated 
by prudent banking practice since a rise in 
interest rates tends to deter risk-averse 
borrowers, so that the average riskiness of the 
remaining loan applications increases (the 
"adverse selection effect"). Additionally, higher 
interest rates tend to induce certain companies to 
undertake projects with lower probabilities of 
success but higher profits when successful, 
increasing lender's risk. A more straightforward 
point still is that the repayment burden imposed 
by a rise in interest rate may increase default 
risk to such an extent that banking prudence would 
suggest that a new loan to a financially 
vulnerable customer should simply not be made. 
Sharply increased interest rates are therefore 
intimately associated with the credit rationing of 
non-preferred applicants. 
Since the liquidity of lenders' portfolios will 
also have been reduced by the sharp increase in 
interest rates, the vulnerable company may find 
that the maturity of overdrafts that were renewed 
without question in normal circumstances has 
become effective and its eligibility for a term 
loan may be temporarily withdrawn; certainly the 
relationship between borrower and lender will 
alter to one of greater dependence. In practice, 
the banks are likely to behave towards distressed 
companies with greater tolerance and helpfulness 
than these theories suggest; the matrix of 
interdependencies among companies that are bank 
customers raises the spectre of a chain of 
defaults if credit is withdrawn too abruptly. 
Company Financial Profiles in Ease and Squeeze 
Years 
Using a random sample of 306 companies we tested 
the hypothesis that changes in Base Rate had 
different effects on interest sensitive and non-
interest sensitive companies. All of the companies 
chosen were included in the Datastream database of 
accounting information from January 1969 onwards. 
This sampling procedure avoided any problems that 
might arise from the inclusion of new companies in 
the groups. Also, since new companies tend to be 
especially vulnerable to financial pressure the 
results presumably understate the consequences of 
high interest rates. Four of the companies 
originally selected were subsequently omitted from 
the sample because of insufficient data in certain 
years, reducing the sample total to 302. One 
hundred and seventy-six (58%) of these companies 
belonged to non-interest sensitive industries and 
126 (42%) to industries previously identified as 
interest sensitive. 
Datastream was used to obtain the financial 
profiles of all companies selected, using data for 
the period 1978-87. The data were then aggregated 
and analysed to uncover any changes that occurred 
when Base Rate was altering in a fashion that 
might not unfairly be characterised as "ease" or 
"squeeze". There are well-known problems in 
identifying periods of monetary ease and 
stringency. Annual data are frequently 
inappropriate since interest rates may fall and 
rise dramatically in the course of a year, as 
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occurred in the UK in 1988. Again, interest rate 
levels may rise by significant amounts in both 
nominal and real terms without apparently exerting 
any very evident squeeze on the economy, as was 
seemingly the case in 1984. The procedure adopted 
by the authors was to define the period 1980-82 as 
one of squeeze in the UK (regardless of the rate 
of growth of sterling M3 or other relatively broad 
monetary variables in these years) and to 
categorise the remaining years of the period 1978-
87 as years of monetary ease; this classification 
is crude and arbitrary, but does have the virtue 
of separating the years of greatest financial 
pressure on British manufacturing from the rest of 
the period. 
Four variables were taken into account in 
evaluating the association of interest rate 
changes and changes in company liquidity: the 
working capital ratio, the quick ratio, the number 
of days credit given and the number of days credit 
received. Secondly, four aspects of profitability 
and asset utilisation were examined: the return on 
shareholder equity, the return on capital 
employed, the net profit margin and the ratio of 
turnover to fixed assets. Thirdly, the capital 
gearing ratio was used to consider the association 
between changes in interest rates and the debt-
equity mix of each company. 
Obviously other sets of variables might have been 
examined. However, the ratios selected are widely 
available, are commonly used in practice, and 
include variables whose behaviour is likely to 
change in a fairly predictable way in periods of 
high interest rates and tight money on the one 
hand and in periods of relative monetary ease on 
the other. 
The average value of each ratio was calculated for 
both groups for the 1980-82 period which we have 
termed "squeeze" and for the other years which we 
have characterised as years of monetary "ease" and 
the information set out in panel A of Table 3. 
Data for the bottom decile of both samples (in 
terms of size) is contained in panel B. 
Table 3 provides information that usefully 
supplements the industrial sector data. Interest 
sensitive companies were on average less 
profitable than their non-interest sensitive 
counterparts in years of expansion and they 
suffered a much sharper decline in profitability 
in the years of squeeze. Their capital gearing 
was higher and increased with financial pressure 
in contrast with the non-interest sensitive group 
of companies which reduced their outstanding 
indebtedness when interest costs were especially 
punitive. The working capital and quick ratios of 
interest sensitive companies were significantly 
higher than those of non-interest sensitive 
companies in spite of the much larger average size 
of the former. However the debtors and creditors 
ratios did not move in conformity with the 
authors' predicted response for financially 
vulnerable companies for either group, although 
the decline in these ratios was more pronounced in 
the squeeze for non-interest sensitive companies, 
suggesting a slightly greater capacity to 
manipulate certain balance sheet variables. 
Panel B contains information which appears to be 
of special relevance to the analysis of this 
paper. The smallest ten per cent of interest 
sensitive companies dramatically increased the 
amount of net credit given, thereby increasing 
company liquid assets as conventionally measured 
but reducing the available cash flow in the years 
characterised by high interest rates; in other 
words, they extended their credit to customers 
substantially but were obliged to pay their bills 
more quickly, a pattern of behaviour consistent 
with the theory of coercive trade credit outlined 
earlier. In contrast, the bottom decile of non-
interest sensitive companies extended less credit 
in the squeeze and accelerated the payment of 
bills even more than their small interest 
sensitive counterparts. 
In other respects, the small interest sensitive 
companies conform to the profile that was etched 
of the financially vulnerable company: 
profitability fell much more steeply than for non-
interest sensitive companies, although starting 
from roughly similar levels; gearing rose for 
small interest sensitive companies but declined 
significantly for small non-interest sensitive 
companies; liquidity (measured by working capital 
and quick ratios) fell for interest sensitive but 
rose for non-interest sensitive small companies. 
In other words, small companies in interest 
sensitive industries conformed in every 
substantive respect to the behaviour pattern 
postulated for the financially vulnerable concern; 
small non-interest sensitive companies did not do 
so. There appears to be good evidence to indicate 
that small, surviving interest sensitive companies 
experienced exceptional financial pressure in the 
squeeze years. 
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The crudity of the testing procedure adopted has 
already been conceded. Interest rate change is a 
complex variable and in theory such factors as (a) 
the size of the change, (b) the frequency of such 
change and, (c) the unexpectedness of the change, 
not to mention (d) the domestic and international 
financial environment in which changes occur 
should also be taken into account in considering 
the likelihood that balance sheet disequilibrium 
will occur. Nevertheless the severity of the 
financial pressure exerted on the UK company 
sector in 1980-82 was so remarkable that, 
plausibly, all the significant factors that 
contribute to balance sheet disequilibrium should 
have been present. 
These results are similar to earlier findings by 
the British economists E W Davis and K A Yeomans 
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(1974) . Their investigations into the balance 
sheets of 200 companies in the years 1966-70 
revealed that small companies which most urgently 
needed overdraft finance to relieve the pressure 
on their liquidity position seemed to have 
suffered worst from heightened standards of 
creditworthiness. Also, they found evidence that, 
when credit became dearer and tighter, the 
smallest and most illiquid companies in the UK 
provided the biggest increase in net trade credit, 
whereas large, financially strong companies 
reduced their net trade credit by the greatest 
amount (strong companies generally increased trade 
credit only as part of a sales drive). Chowdhury, 
Green and Miles (1986) found that in the period 
1969-1983 companies tended to increase both liquid 
assets and trade credit received during years of 
rising Base Rate; at the same time they reduced 
bank borrowing and curtailed trade credit given. 
Since their sample was composed of large quoted 
companies, their findings were compatible with 
those of Davis and Yeomans for the earlier period. 
As one might anticipate, within both interest 
sensitive and non-interest sensitive groups, small 
businesses appear to be hardest hit. Recent 
research by the Forum of Private Business has 
confirmed that late payment of debt - on average 
75 days between date of invoice and payment - in 
combination with the high cost of bank borrowing, 
on which small companies are reliant to compensate 
for slow payment, is the major source of anxiety. 
According to the results of the Forum's New 
Regional Survey of Business Opinions (9 September 
1988) small businesses in Scotland and in other 
regions that have yet to experience the benefits 
of the Thatcherite boom cited high interest costs 
as a source of serious cash-flow problems early in 
the summer of 1988 i n advance of the most 
significant increases in the cost of borrowing. 
The Forum reported that nearly two out of five 
ownei—managers in Scotland considered finance and 
interest rates to be their main problem and 
concluded that 45 per cent of Scotland's 150,000 
small firms were experiencing cash-flow problems 
arising from the impact of high interest rates on 
their activities. With each successive rise in the 
Base Rate of the clearing banks, therefore, the 
matrix of cash-flow interdependencies tightens the 
noose around the financially vulnerable concern; 
the size of an unanticipated demand for cash that 
may cause financial distress becomes smaller. 
Conclusion 
The argument that British industry will not be 
significantly affected by repeated increases in 
the Base Rate of the clearing banks should be 
treated with reservation. In a homogeneous economy 
without regional disparities in income, employment 
and industrial mix this type of counter-
inflationary measure may have substantial merit. 
However, the evidence of the "dear money" periods 
in the early years of the 1980s is that high 
interest rates are non-neutral among regions, 
among industries and among companies within 
different industrial sectors. The discriminatory 
nature of a high interest rate policy is most 
pernicious when manufacturing industries in the 
regions whose overheated condition has prompted 
such measures are the least affected by them. Per 
contra when the industrial sectors of regions 
characterised by high unemployment and relatively 
low growth of real incomes are particularly 
heavily penalised, the measure is self-evidently 
inappropriate. 
On the evidence of this paper the inability of 
financially vulnerable companies to restructure 
their assets and liabilities in a fashion that 
would diminish the impact of higher interest rates 
on their cash flow is particularly marked among 
the smallest companies in the industries that we 
have described as interest sensitive. A 
disproportionate number of vulnerable enterprises 
appear to be located in regions outside the South 
of England. These regions have therefore been 
placed at a relative disadvantage by current 
Government policy and are being made to suffer for 
conditions of excess demand existing elsewhere. 
The case for regionally differentiated policy 
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instruments (Begg, 1972) deserves renewed 
attention. 
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Figure 1 Interest / Operating Profit R 
Source: Dataatre&m 
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Years 
For " In te res t Sensit ive" 
For All Consumer & Capi 
TABLE 1 
PERCENTAGE EMPLOYMENT SHARE BY REGION IN INTEREST SENSITIVE INDUS 
Region 
North 
Yorkshire & 
Humberside 
East Midlands 
East Anglia 
South East 
South West 
West Midlands 
North West 
Wales 
Scotland • 
N. Ireland 
Total 
(1) 
Metal 
Manufacturing 
10.3 
23.3 
5.0 
0.5 
8.1 
1.6 
20.6 
6.0 
15.9 
8.6 
0.1 
100.0 
(2) 
Chemical 
11.2 
8.7 
6.1 
2.3 
28.9 
3.3 
4.3 
22.5 
4.5 
7.5 
0.7 
100.0 
(3) 
Mechanical 
Engineering 
6.6 
11.0 
9.4 
4.0 
24.7 
6.6 
13.1 
11.9 
3.0 
8.6 
1.1 
100.0 
(4) 
Motors 
2.2 
5.6 
3.2 
2.3 
30.7 
2.9 
28.1 
15.3 
5.2 
3.5 
1.0 
100.0 
(5) 
Textiles 
2.7 
21.0 
27.9 
0.4 
3.2 
2.1 
4.5 
18.3 
1.6 
13.5 
4.8 
100.0 
(6) 
Shipping 8 
Transport* 
9.6 
5.7 
9.8 
1.0 
21.6 
17.9 
5.2 
14.2 
0.9 
10.4 
3.7 
100.0 
(7 
Inte 
Sens 
Indu 
6 
11 
9 
2 
21 
6 
12 
14 
4 
8 
1 
100 
* Aerospace is included in this industry for the purpose of this table because it was not 
possible to obtain disaggregated data for 1978 and 1981. This inclusion results in som 
of comparability with Datastream statistics. 
Source: Census of Production, 1981 
Figure 2 Index of Company Liquidati 
i — i — i — i — i — i i — i — 
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Base year 1970= 100 
Source: Economic Trends, various editions 
Years 
For "Interest Se 
For all Industri 
Table 2 
Year 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
Registrations and Insolvencies of Companies 
New 
in Scotland 
Company 
Registrations 
No. 
2955 
3514 
3270 
3475 
4211 
4781 
4976 
5417 
5999 
4637 
% Change 
-
18.9 
- 6.9 
6.3 
21.2 
12.0 
5.5 
8.9 
10.7 
-22.7 
Companv 
Insolvencies3 
No. % 
274 
238 
379 
438 
503 
521 
523 
537 
511 
461 
Change 
-
-13.1 
59.2 
15.6 
14.8 
3.6 
0.3 
2.7 
- 4.8 
- 9.8 
a
 Includes Compulsory and Creditor Voluntary Liquidations. 
Source: Scottish Economic Bulletin, various editions; and 
Annual Abstract of Statistics.1989. 
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Table 3 
Panel A Financial Profile of Sample 
Debtors Ratio 
Creditors Ratio3 
Return on Equity 
Return on Capital 
Employed 
Net Profit Margin 
Turnover/Fixed Assets 
Gearing Ratio 
Working Capital Ratio 
Quick Ratio 
No. of Companies 
Interest 
Ease 
76.96 
74.49 
7.13 
14.94 
2.83 
6.21 
24.17 
1.85 
1.02 
Sensitive 
Squeeze 
76.07 
72.48 
3.56 
11.64 
1.64 
5.85 
25.46 
1.89 
0.99 
126 
Non-Interest Sensitive 
Ease Squeeze 
Average Size (Total Assets) £312.5m 
68.68 
73.44 
10.31 
17.34 
4.11 
6.09 
23.63 
1.59 
0.89 
65.99 
69.97 
5.99 
14.93 
2.75 
6.07 
22.49 
1.64 
0.89 
176 
£106 .8m 
Panel B Financial Profile of Bottom Decile 
Debtors Ratio 
Creditors Ratio3 
Return on Equity 
Return on Capital 
Employed 
Net Profit Margin 
Turnover/Fixed Assets 
Gearing Ratio 
Working Capital Ratio 
Quick Ratio 
No. of Companies 
Interest Sensitive 
Ease 
76.90 
75.31 
10.90 
18.07 
2.79 
8.63 
25.93 
1.77 
0.97 
Squeeze 
84.19 
69.26 
3.73 
13.43 
0.37 
7.38 
27.61 
1.73 
0.88 
13 
Average Size (Total Assets) £2.8m 
Non-Inter 
Ease 
63.50 
69.68 
10.96 
16.84 
4.61 
4.22 
28.79 
1.52 
0.83 
£1 
est 
18 
: Sensitive 
Squeeze 
60.75 
61.69 
7.50 
15.61 
3.47 
4.44 
26.02 
1.62 
0.88 
.8m 
a
 One outlier was eliminated from both groups and the average ratio 
recalculated for the remaining sample. 
